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NOTES
Antitrust-United States v. American Building Maintenance
Industries: A Narrow Construction of Section 7 of the Clayton Act
The United States Supreme Court has clearly and consistently held
that "Congress wanted to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional
power in restraining trust and monopoly agreements . . ." when it
enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act. Consequently, the Sherman Act
has been applied to cases involving entirely intrastate activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.' In United States v. American
Building Maintenance Industries3 the Supreme Court ruled that the
jurisdictional reach of section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act4 does not
extend as far as that of the Sherman Act. Instead, the Court held that
the Clayton Act applies only to corporations that are actually involved in
interstate commerce. 5 The American Building decision, coupled with
the Court's decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.,6 which
limited the application of the Robinson-Patman Act7 to persons actually
engaged in interstate commerce, not only limits the effective scope of the
federal antitrust laws but also suggests that the present Supreme Court
may be hostile toward vigorous enforcement of those laws.
The Government commenced a civil antitrust action against Amer-
ican Building Maintenance Industries, contending that the corporation's
acquisition of the stock of J.E. Benton Management Corp. and its
merger of Benton Industries into one of its wholly owned subsidiaries
violated section 7 of the Clayton Act.8 American Building was the
1. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954);
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
3. 95 S. Ct. 2150 (1975). Mr. Justice Stewart wrote the opinion of the Court. Mr.
Justice White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, while Mr. Justice Brennan
joined in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas. Mr. Justice Blackmun filed a
separate dissenting opinion.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). This section deals with the acquisition by one cor-
poration of the stock or assets of another.
5. 95 S. Ct. at 2157-58.
6. 419 U.S. 186 (1974). Mr. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion in this
case; Mr. Justice Brennan joined in Mr. Justice Douglas's dissent. Mr. Justice Blackmun
was the only member of the majority in Gulf Oil to dissent from the American Building
decision.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). In 1936 the Robinson-Patman Act rewrote the price
discrimination provisions of section 2 of the Clayton Act.
8. 95 S. Ct. at 2153-54. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for
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largest supplier of janitorial services in Southern California, handling
ten percent of the sales in that area. The two acquired corporations
together supplied an additional seven percent of those services. While
American Building was clearly involved in interstate commerce, 9 the
Court concluded that the Benton companies were not.1" Therefore, since
section 7 of the Clayton Act explicitly states that both the acquiring and
the acquired corporation must be "engaged in commerce" for that Act
to apply," the Court ruled that this case did not fall within the jurisdic-
tional ambit of the Act. The crucial aspect of the case, however, is not
the Court's discussion of whether the Benton corporations were in fact
engaged in interstate commerce; 12 more important is the Court's initial
decision that the "engaged in commerce" language of the Clayton Act
requires a corporation to be actually involved in interstate commerce
rather than merely involved in activities that affect interstate commerce
before it falls within the scope of the Act.
The Court persuasively reasoned that FTC v. Bunte Brothers13
provided strong support for its construction of the "engaged in com-
merce" language of section 7 of the Clayton Act. 4 In that case the
Court held that the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission under
the Central District of California. The district court granted American Building Mainte-
nance Industries' motion for summary judgment holding that there had been no violation
of section 7 of the Clayton Act. The Government then appealed directly to the Supreme
Court pursuant to section 2 of the Expediting Act, 32 Stat. 823 (1903), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 29 (1970). 95 S. Ct. at 2152-53.
9. 95 S. Ct. at 2153. There was no dispute on this point.
10. Id. at2158.
11. The relevant jurisdictional language of section 7 of the Clayton Act follows:
"No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or
any party of the stock or other share capital . . . of the assets of another corporation
engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country,
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970) (emphasis added).
12. All of the Benton companies' janitorial and maintenance contracts were per-
formed within California. These companies did not advertise nationally, and they made
only very limited use of interstate communications. The Benton companies hired their
labor in the local market and purchased most of their equipment and supplies from local
distributors. The companies did, however, service customers who were engaged in
interstate commerce. For the Court's discussion of why such activities do not constitute
participation in interstate commerce, see 95 S. Ct. at 2158-59. For Mr. Justice White's
argument that such activities may well constitute participation in interstate commerce,
see his concurring opinion, 95 S. Ct. at 2159.
13. 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
14. 95 S. Ct. at 2154-55. The Court also suggests that Gulf Oil v. Copp Paving Co.,
419 U.S. 186 (1974), supports its conclusion. Gulf Oil held that the "in commerce"
language of the Robinson-Patman Act does not extend to the full commerce clause power
of Congress but rather is limited to activities actually constituting interstate commerce,
i.e. the Robinson-Patman Act does not extend to purely intrastate activities that substan-
tially affect interstate commerce. 95 S. Ct. at 2154.
CLAYTON ACT
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which regulates "unfair
methods of competition in commerce," was limited to competition that
involved actual interstate commerce. 15 While this decision does not
provide a direct precedent for the American Building issue, it is persua-
sive by way of analogy since section 7 of the Clayton Act and section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act were enacted by the same Con-
gress 6 and, as the Court notes, were both "designed to deal with closely
related aspects of the same problem-the protection of free and fair
competition in the Nation's market places. '17
But there are several reasons for concluding that Bunte Brothers
provides less support for the American Building decision than suggested
by the Court. First, as the Court recognized, the words "in commerce"
do not have a uniform meaning whenever used by Congress.18 Certainly,
the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act were passed by
the same Congress with the goal of protecting free trade and competi-
tion; but the two acts involve -very different substantive provisions.
While the Federal Trade Commission Act established an administrative
agency with a broad mandate to police against unfair trade practices, the
Clayton Act renders specified actions illegal.' 9 The Bunte Brothers
Court based its decision partially upon its fear that a broad construction
of the jurisdictional language of section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act would create a grave danger of undue federal interference
in local affairs.20 The specific provisions of the Clayton Act, however,
offend less against these notions of federalism than does the idea of a
federal agency with "pervasive control over myriads of local businesses
in matters heretofore traditionally left to local custom or local law."'"
15. The Commission claimed that it could proceed against unfair methods of
competition used in intrastate sales when those sales result in a handicap to interstate
competitors. The Court rejected.this view. 312 U.S. 349, 350.
16. The Sixty-third Congress.
17. 95 S. Ct. at 2155.
18. E.g., Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 520-21 (1941).
19. For example, section 7 of the Clayton Act applies only to the acquisition of the
stock or assets of one corporation by another corporation. For a discussion of the
purposes of the Sherman, Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts see Oppenheim,
Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act with the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 MIcH. L. REv. 821 (1961). The purposes of these acts are
also discussed in FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1931).
20. The Court emphasized the need for a proper adjustment of local and national
interests in Bunte Brothers. The Court said, "We ought not to find in § 5 radiations
beyond the obvious meaning of language unless otherwise the purpose of the Act would
be defeated." 312 U.S. at 351.
21. Id. at 354-55. The Court went on to say that "Ealn inroad upon local
conditions and local standards of such far-reaching import as is involved here, ought to
await a clearer mandate from Congress." Id. at 355.
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Furthermore, Congress responded to the Bunte Brothers decision in
1974 by extending the Federal Trade Commission's jurisdiction to the
full extent of Congress's commerce clause power.22 While this action by
a later Congress does not speak directly to the intent of the framers of
the Act, it is at least suggestive.
In American Building the Court also relied upon the difference
between the jurisdictional language of the Sherman Act and that of the
Clayton Act to support its holding.3 The Sherman Act forbids conduct
"in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations",24 while section 7 of the Clayton Act applies to corpora-
tions "engaged in commerce. 25 Certainly the Sherman Act's language is
broader, and, as the Court suggests in Gulf Oil v. Copp Paving Co., the
"in commerce" language of the Robinson-Patman Act and the Clayton
Act "appears to denote only persons or activities within the flow of
interstate commerce-the practical, economic continuity in the genera-
tion of goods and services for interstate markets and their transport and
distribution to the consumer. 26
But the Court failed to investigate the import of this difference in
jurisdictional language fully enough. It is clear from Kirschbaum Co. v.
Walling27 and related cases that the phrase "in commerce" does not have
a uniform meaning whenever used by Congress. Furthermore, the Bunte
Brothers case relied upon so heavily by the Court in American Building
states that,
[w]hen in order to protect interstate commerce Congress has regu-
lated activities which in isolation are merely local, it has normally
conveyed its purpose explicitly. . . . [T]o be sure, the con-
struction of every such statute presents a unique problem in which
words derive vitality from the aim and nature of the specific legis-
lation.28
Since it is well established that the aim of the Clayton Act was to reach
agreements embraced by the Sherman Act in their incipiency,29 one
22. Congress replaced the words "in commerce" with "in or affecting commerce" in
sections 5, 6 and 12 of the Act. The purpose of Congress was clear. "It is unrealistic to
restrict the jurisdiction of the FTC under section 5 of the Act to only interstate
transactions." U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1974, at 7712-13.
23. 95 S. Ct. at 2155-56.
24. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
25. Clayton Act, id. § 18.
26. 419 U.S. at 195.
27. 316 U.S. 517 (1941).
28. 312 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added).
29. E.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589
(1957); FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1931); Standard Fashion Co. v.
Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 355-57 (1922).
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cannot fairly conclude merely from an ambiguous change in jurisdic-
tional language that Congress intended the Clayton Act to have a more
limited jurisdictional reach than the Sherman Act. 0 Such a conclusion,
based upon the jurisdictional language of the two acts, seems especially
unwarranted when one considers that before the Clayton Act was enact-
ed the Court often held that wholly intrastate acts could be "in restraint
of trade or commerce" as that phrase was used in the Sherman Act.31
Furthermore, the definition of "commerce" in the Clayton Act is "trade
or commerce among the several States," and before the Clayton Act was
enacted the Court held on several occasions that "among the several
States" embraces all commerce "except that which is confined to a single
State, and does not affect other States.132
The Supreme Court also offered a strong reenactment argument in
support of its holding in American Building. The Court concluded that
regardless of whether Congress intended to extend the Clayton Act to its
full commerce clause power when that Act was enacted in 1914, by
1950 when the Clayton Act was reenacted the phrase "engaged in com-
merce" had become "a term of art, indicating a limited assertion of fed-
eral jurisdiction." 3  Certainly it is true that prior to 1950 the Court had
clearly distinguished between activities "in interstate commerce" and
those "affecting interstate commerce. ' 34  Furthermore, the Bunte
30. The Court also notes that the Sherman Act proscribes every contract, combina-
tion or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, whether entered into by a natural
person, partnership, corporation or other form of business organization, while section 7
of the Clayton Act is limited to corporate acquisitions. 95 S. Ct. at 2155. This limitation
implies, according to the Court's analysis, that Congress might well have intended to
limit the jurisdiction of section 7 in other ways as well. But the corporate limitation of
section 7 involves an entirely different aspect of jurisdiction than does the "in commerce"
language; the corporate limitation involves not the type of activity covered by the Act
but rather the type of individuals and organizations covered by it. One would expect the
very specific kinds of problems dealt with in section 7 of the Clayton Act, unlike the
broad problems addressed by the Sherman Act, to involve primarily corporations.
Furthermore, the Federal Trade Commission has held that it has authority under section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to proceed against section 7 Clayton-type
violations by persons and partnerships. In re Beatrice Foods Co., 67 F.T.C. 473, 724-27
(1965). In any case, the Court in American Building does not rely heavily upon the
limitation of section 7 to corporate acquisitions.
31. United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 541-43 (1913); Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375, 397 (1905). On this point see Mr. Justice Douglas's dissent in Gulf
Oil, 419 U.S. at 204.
32. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1912) (emphasis
added); see Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 398-99 (1913). Mr. Justice Douglas
discusses these cases in his dissent in Gulf Oil, 419 U.S. at 204.
33. 95S.Ct.at2156.
34. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); A.L.A.
Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542-44 (1935). The Bunte Brothers
decision is, of course, also on point here.
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Brothers decision (limiting the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Com-
mission under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act) pre-
ceded the reenactment of the Clayton Act in 1950. In addition, as the
Court notes, Congress had demonstrated prior to 1950 its awareness
of the distinction between a limited assertion of its commerce clause
power, including only activities actually in interstate commerce, and a
full assertion of its commerce clause power, including activities affect-
ing interstate commerce.3 5 Consequently, the Court concluded that
Congress's decision to retain the "engaged in commerce" language in
1950 clearly implied a congressional intent, at least in 1950, to limit the
reach of section 7 of the Clayton Act to corporations actually engaged
in interstate commerce. 6,
While Congress's actions in 1950 do support the Court's conclu-
sion, an investigation of the legislative history of the reenactment of the
Clayton Act in 1950 raises serious questions about that conclusion.3 7
The changes made in the language of the Act in 1950 were designed to
expand its coverage. Congress intended, as the Court noted in American
Building, to expand the Act's coverage to include acquisition of assets as
well as stocks.38 By deleting the "acquiring-acquired" language from the
original text,39 Congress hoped to render it clear that section 7 applied
to vertical and conglomerate mergers as well as to mergers between
competitors.40 Indeed, "the dominant theme pervading congressional
consideration of the 1950 amendments was a fear of what was consid-
ered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the American
economy. '41 It seems anomalous at best that a Congress so clearly
concerned with economic concentration would limit the jurisdictional
ambit of an antitrust statute while simultaneously expanding its substan-
35. E.g., the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970), adopted an
"affecting commerce" jurisdictional standard.
36. 95 S. Ct. at 2157.
37. For a full discussion of the legislative history of the reenactment of the Clayton
Act in 1950, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 312-23 (1962).
38. 95S.Ct.at2157.
39. Material in brackets was deleted in 1950, while material in italics was added.
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole
or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce,
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
auisition may be [to] substantially to lessen competition [between the corpo-
tion whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition,
or to restrain such commerce in any section or community], or to tend to
create a monopoly [of any line of commerce].
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311 n.18 (1962).
40. Id. at 317.
41. Id. at 315.
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rive scope. Furthermore, it is important to consider that Congress acted
not only against the background of the Bunte Brothers decision and
with an awareness of the in commerce-affecting commerce distinction,
but also against the background of the broad judicial interpretation of
the Sherman Act's jurisdictional scope and with an awareness that the
phrase "engaged in commerce" does not have a uniform meaning.
Consequently, an examination of the legislative history of the Clayton
Act diminishes the strength of the Court's reenactment argument.
Finally, the American Building Court reasoned that the past en-
forcement policies of the Federal Trade Commission and of the Depart-
ment of Justice suggest that a broad jurisdictional scope is unnecessary
to accomplish the goals of section 7 of the Clayton Act.4 2 The Federal
Trade Commission has held that section 7 applies only to activities
involving interstate commerce.43 The Department of Justice has limited
its previous cases under section 7 almost exclusively to those that clearly
involved firms actually participating in interstate commerce. 44 But in
concluding that these policies support its holding, the Court ignores two
crucial points. First, whether the enforcement agencies choose to employ
a power granted by Congress has no bearing upon what power Congress
did in fact grant. Second, there may well be practical reasons, such as
manpower shortages and department priorities, that explain the Justice
Department's decision to limit its enforcement effort primarily to firms
in interstate commerce. Such pragmatic decisions should not, however,
imply that the Justice Department lacks or does not need the power to
proceed against firms affecting interstate commerce when those firms
pose serious antitrust problems.
The four arguments advanced by the Court to support its
holding-the Bunte Brothers analogy, the language of the Act, the
reenactment argument and the past enforcement policy argument-
would be more than sufficient to justify its holding in the absence of
strong countervailing considerations. But since the acknowledged pur-
pose of the Clayton Act is to supplement the Sherman Act by arresting
restraints on trade in their incipiency,45 and since the Sherman Act
clearly extends to the full limit of Congress's commerce clause power,4
it is highly anomalous to attribute to Congress an intent to limit the
42. 95 S. Ct. at 2157.
43. E.g., Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 75 F.T.C. 813, 918 (1969); Foremost
Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1031-33 (1962).
44. 95 S. Ct. at 2157.
45. See note 27 supra.
46. See note 1 supra.
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jurisdictional scope of the Clayton Act. Such an action should not be
attributed to Congress without a very clear demonstration of congres-
sional intent. Yet, the Supreme Court in American Building reached its
conclusion on the basis of arguments that, while valid, fall short of
clearly establishing such a congressional intent.
The direct practical implications of the Supreme Court's decision in
American Building are not crucial since most section 7 actions do
involve corporations actually participating in interstate commerce; only
a relatively small number of important cases will fall outside the reach of
the Clayton Act as a result of the decision. More importantly, however,
the American Building decision, coupled with the Gulf Oil v. Copp
Paving Co. decision, suggest a hostility on the part of the Burger Court
toward vigorous enforcement of the federal antitrust laws. This hostility
may be reflected in the Court's handling of other antitrust issues.
RicHAR_ A. SIMPSON
Civil Rights-A Back Pay Award Standard: Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 as amended by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,2 represents the Congres-
sional effort to eradicate discrimination in pfiblic and private employ-
ment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.' Since
July 2, 19651 the federal judiciary has possessed discretion under Title
VII to award back pay to employees and applicants for employment
who prove that they were the victims of unlawful employment prac-
tices.' In exercising this discretion the lower federal courts have devel-
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. 11, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
3. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1)-(2) (1970).
4. This is the effective date of id. § 2000e (1970).
5. Id. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
This section provides that:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is inten-
tionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the com-
plaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate (emphasis added).
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